.D.ESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION: STATUTORY RIGHT-OF
1I4USBAND TO DISSENT FRCOM WIFE'S WILL HELD5
"UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER MARRIED WOMAN'S
PROPERTY PROVISION IN NORTH CAROLINA
CONSTITUTION

AT

COMMON

LmW, a married woman did not have the right to make

a will," and she could only effect transfer of property at her death

with the aid of equity or through the exercise of a power of appointment 2

Beginning in the 1830's, however, states began tb

pass legislation designed to confer upon married women certain
rights in their separate property3 including the right to make inter
"vivos and testamentary conveyances.4 As the law developed in -this
area, the rights of married women approached equality with those
of their husbands, and in some jurisdictions their rights became

superior.6
As early as 1784, North. Carolina legislation reflected this general

pattern of concern over the property rights of married women. In
that year North Carolina married women were first e-n5Wr-ed "f6
dissent fkom their husbands' wills and take their intestate-share in his
personal estate.6 At the time, this was a much-needed privilege in
1

See 1 MORDEcAi, LAw LEmrE 371 (2d ed. 1916) [hereinafter cited as MoicECAIi;
944 (1958)
•1 PACE, Wrs §§ 12.10, 12.14 (4th ed. 1960); 6 PowELL, REAL PRorTY
[hereinafter cited as PowELL]; THnomsoN, WLS § 58 (3d ed. 1947); 3 Va.Imm, Amu'jcAN FAwmY IAws § 181 (1935) [hereinafter cited as VERNIER].
See I PACE, WiLts §§ 12.12-.13 - (4th ed. 1960); 4 Po~mRoy, EquiTY JURISPRUDENCE
117 (1949); TnOmPSON, WILLs § 58 (8d ed.
§§ 1098, 1103-06 (5th ed. 1941); 1 Po wE
1947).

2
Some states moved in a step-by-step manner, obtaining judicial interpretation of
each change in the law, and then enacting subsequent changes to correct misinterpretatations. Other states, perhaps irritated with the courts! distrust for innovation and strict
construction of statutes in derogation of'the common law, attempted to free the wife
entirely with one comprehensive revision. Such individualized state action resulted
in law lacking uniformity and simplicity. See generally 1 AiPaascA LAw or PioPaRiy
§ 5.56 (1952); 1 PowEmr. 117; 3 VERNIER § 167.
944; 1 THOMPSON, NViL.ts § 58 (8d ed.
'See generally 1 PowELL 117; 6 Powrr.a
1917); 3 VERNIER §§ 181-83; Bordwell, The Statute Law of Wills (pts..1.4), 14 IowA L.
REV., 1, 172, 283, 428 (1928-1929); Rees, American Wills Statutes: 1, 46 VA. L. REV. 613,
657-58 (1960).
5See 3 VmNm § 167. Perhaps the most common superior right has been that of
dower or its statutory substitutes, while a -urviving hlisband has no share of his
deceased wife's property other than that which may be left him by her will.: See
table in Phipps, Marital Property Interests,27 RocKY Ir. L. REV. 180, 191-208 (1955).
e N.C. Sess. Laws 1784, ch. 204, § 8,. as amended, .N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 (Supp.
1961). See generally DOUGLAS, ADMINIS'RATION OF ESTATES IN NoRT CAROLINA §§-18,48,
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view of the husband's rights jure mariti as to his wife's property.7
Major legislation concerning a wife's rights in her separate property,
however, was first enacted in 1868 as a part of North Carolina's
reconstruction constitution. The provision, similar to married
womens' property acts, gave the wife a right to devise and bequeath
her separate property "as if she were unmarried."' In removing the
disabilities of married women, the provision also terminated most
of the husband's common law marital property rights. Removal of
these prerogatives resulted in new disability, for the North Carolina
Supreme Court interpreted the 1868 constitutional provision as
having cut off both the husband's common law right to curtesy initiate and curtesy consummate,0 except in his wife's intestate property. 10
The net result was that a husband had neither the right to dissent
from his wife's will nor any right to a prescribed share in the property as to which she died testate. 11 Therefore, a wife had complete
freedom of testation, and could totally disinherit her husband, while
at the same time a husband could not obviate the possibility of his
wife receiving at least her intestate share, 12 except by pre-marital
agreement.
158 (1948) [hereinafter cited as DouoLAs]; 2 MORDECAI 1156; 1171; Bolich, North Carolina's New Intestate Succession Act: II: Election, Dissent and Renunciation, 39 N.C.L.
REv..17, 24 (1960); McCall and Langston, A New Intestate Succession Statute for
North Carolina,11 N.C.L. Rv.266, 274 (193).
7The husband's rights of marriage at common law were extensive. See generally 1
MORDECAI 291-96, 389. The right to dissent, therefore, protected the wife against
complete disinheritance, thus protecting the family unit. See I NWOERNER, AMERICAN
LAW OF AnsmszxsmAnON 17, 64 (3d ed. rev. 1923).
sN.C. CONSr. art. X, § 6, provides: "The real and personal property of any female
in this State acquired before marriage, and all property, real and personal, to which
she may, after marriage, become in any manner entitled, shall be and remain the sole
and separate estate and property of such female, and shall not be liable for any debts,
obligations, or engagements of her husband, and may be devised and bequeathed, and,
"
with the written assent of her husband, conveyed by her as if she were unmarried ....
Since there were two principal legal classes of women at common law, i.e., married
women and unmarried women, it appears that the General Assembly concluded that
separate property rights could best be conferred upon a married woman by including
her in a class (that of single women) whose property rights were already recognized.
'Walker v. Long, 109 N.C. 510, 14 S.E. 299 (1891) (curtesy initiate); Tiddy v.
Graves, 126 N.C. 620, 36 S.E. 127 (1900) (curtesy consummate). It is generally held that
chrtesy initiate was abolished by married womens property legislation. However, there
is a split of authority on whether curtesy consummate in her testate property was
See 2 TIFFANY, REAL PaoPaR § 575 (3d ed. 1939).
abolished.
0
2 See I MORDECAI 294.
11
See I MORDECAI 294-95; Bolich, supra note 6, at 24.
3. See Dour.As 39, 48; 1 MORDECAI 294-95. These authorities do not comment directly on the unfairness of the law, nor do they propose any solutions. However,
criticism and corrective provisions are to be found in McCall and Langston, supra note

6, at 274.
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Thus, it became apparent in a number of states that legislation
intended merely to give wives equal rights in their separate property
had actually given them superior rights and placed husbands in an
unequal position. Subsequently, efforts were made to equalize the
inter vivos rights of married persons and protect the surviving spouse
through a limitation of the right of the decedent to devise or bequeath property. 3
In North Carolina, the General Assembly, without an accompanying constitutional amendment, passed corrective legislation'- in the
Intestate Succession Act of 1959.15 This act, inter alia, permitted
either the surviving husband or wife to dissent from the deceased
spouse's will and to take a prescribed fee simple share if an amount
equal to that share was not provided by the will or by certain inter
vivos provisions.'(
The above provision in the Intestate Succession Act was held
unconstitutional in the recent case of Dudley v. Staton.U Rufus L.
Dudley, whose deceased wife had not devised him any interest in
her property, dissented from her will and brought a partition action
to obtain his statutory fee simple share. In compliance with the
statute, the lower court awarded partition of the land and gave
Dudley his prescribed share. On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the General Assembly could not abridge
the right of a married woman to dispose of her property by will "as
1

3Some states give both husband and wife protection, while others protect only the
wife. See generally I PAGE, Wius §§ 16.6-16.7 (4th ed. 1960). Community property
laws usually provide that half of the community property belongs to the survivor.
Some states still retain common law dower and curtesy without other protection.
See generally, the table in Phipps, supra note 5, at 191-208.
' North Carolina was not inadvertent to the inequalities of the former law and to
the changes which were necessary. In 1933, it was suggested that it was time t6
abandon "antiquated doctrines of intestate succession by regulating the devolution of
property in terms of a modern social and economic order." McCall and Langston,
supra
1 note 6, at 269.
rN.C. GEN. STAT. §§29-1 to -30, 20-1 to -3 (Supp. 1961).
ZBN.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 30-1 to -3 (Supp. 1961). Section 30-1 (a) provides that "a
spouse may dissent from his deceased spouse's will in those cases where the aggregate
value of the provisions under the will for benefit of the surviving spouse, when added
to the value of the property or interests in property passing in any manner outside
the will to the surviving spouse as a result of the death of the testator. (1) Is less
than the intestate share of such spouse, or (2) Is less than one-half of the deceased
spouse's net estate in those cases where the deceased spouse is not survived by a child,
children, or any lineal descendant of a deceased child or children, or by a parent."
Subsections 30-1 (b) and (c) make provision for valuing the decedent's estate.
Section 30-2 provides for the time and manner of dissent, while § 30-3 provides for
the effect of the dissent.
17 257 N.C. 572, 126 S.E.2d 590 (1962).
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if she were unmarried."' 8 The court said that inasmuch as this
right was created by the constitution in absolute and unambiguous
language, any attempt to limit it by statute was unconstitutional.
In so holding, the court relied principally on two old North
Carolina cases which dealt with the effect of the 1868 constitutional
provision on the husband's common law right of curtesy in his wife's
property. The first case was an 1891 decision involving curtesy
initiate, 9 where the court stated that the 1868 provision was very
broad, and plainly gave the wife complete ownership and control
of her property as if she were unmarried. Nine years later, in the
second case relied upon,20 the provision was invoked to deny curtesy
consummate in devised property. In striking down this right, the
court said: "With this explicit provision in the Constitution, no
statute and no decision could restrict the wife's power to devise and
bequeath her property as fully and completely as if she had remained
! 2
Neither of these early decisions cited any authority
unmarried."
for the interpretation given to this provision. The court in both
cases read the provision literally, considered it plain on its face, and
therefore unsusceptible to any other construction.22
However, another construction of the 1868 provision was available, and the court in the Dudley case was not compelled to follow
the two old curtesy cases. In Flanner v. Flanner, the court in
construing a subsequently enacted statute held that a married woman
does not have an absolute right to dispose of her property by will;
Here the court indicated that the purpose of the 1868 provision was
"ito remove.., the common-law restrictions on the right of married
women to convey their property and dispose of same by will, and was
not intended to confer on them the right to make wills freed from
any and all legislative regulation." 24 In Dudley, however, Justice
"I d. at 581, 126 8.E_2d at 597, quoting article X, § 6 of the North Carolina consti-"
tution.
29 Walker v. Long, 109. N.C. 510, 14 S.E. 299 (1891).
20 Tiddy v. Graves, 126 N.C. 620, 36 S.E. 127 (1900).

21

1d. at 623, 36 S.E. at 128.

.2 Several subsequent North Carolina cases followed this early interpretation as to
common law curtesy, but only these two cases were cited as authority for this position.
See, e.g., Freeman v. Lide, 176 N.C. 434, 97 S.E. 402 (1918) (right of a married woman
to devise and bequeath her property); Richardson v. Richardson, 150 N.C. 549, 64 S.E.
510 (1909) (wife may by will deprive husband of curtesy consummate); Watts v.
Griffin, 137 N.G. 572, 50 S.E. 218 (1905); Hallyburton v. Slagle, 132 N.C. 947, 44 S.E.
655 (1903) (latter two cases cited with approval Tiddy v. Graves).
2 160 N.C. 126, 75 S.E. 936 (1912).
at 129, 75 S.E. at 937. In the Flannercase, legislation providing that a child
21d.
born after the making of a parent's will and unprovided for therein could take his
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Parker refused to yield to this construction,, although it appears to
be a more accurate interpretation of the legal objective sought to be
accomplished" and the economic and social purposes underlying the

constitudonal provision.
It is submitted that the decision in Dudley, although consistent
with the majority of prior statements by the North Carolina Supreme

Court, is not in accord with the better interpretation of the policy
reasons for married womens' property acts.

The decision clearly

frustrates the attempt of the General Assembly to equalize the rights
of married persons with regard to a share in the estate of the survivor.

Decisions in other jurisdictions, as wvell as the analyses of commentators, are to the effect that married womens' property legislation
was not enacted to give a wife an absolute right in her separate

property, but to remove the common law disabilities of married
women as to their separate property arid to free it from the marital
control of husbands. 5

In the instant case, the court was cognizant

of inconsistency in the interpretation which had been given the
constitutional provision,26 and could justifiably have reached a contrary result. Indeed, when considering similar statutory and con9titutional provisions the Utah Supreme Court so held. 27
intestate, share in the parent's estate was- contested by- a married woman's executor on.
the ground that the statute was an unconstitutional abridgement of her right to make
a'will as though unmarried. In upholding its constitutionality, the court stated that
the "right to dispose of property by will is a conventional rather than an inherent
right, and its regulation rests largely with the Legislature except where and to the
extent that [the] same is restricted by constitutional inhibition." Ibid.
r See Sykes v. Chadwick, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 141 (1873) (District of Columbia);
State v. Herndon, 158 Fla. 115, 27 So. 2d 833 (1946); Cole v. Van Riper, 44 IMI. 58
(1867); Schindel v. Schindel, 12 Md. 108 (1858); Johnson v. Cummins, 16 N.J. Eq. 97
(1863); Madget v. Madget, 85 Ohio App. 18, 87 N.E.2d 918 (1949); Walker v. Reamy,
36 Pa. 410 (1860); Bloomfield v. Brown, 67 R.I. 452, 25 A.2d 354 (1942); see generally
2 BisHoP, MARmUuD Wor~mN §§ 11-27 (1875); 1 PowELL 117; STmwAr, HusBAND AND
Wwin § 150 (1885); 6 THOMsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 2955 (Perm. ed. rev. repl. 1962);
Bolich, supra note 6, at 27. But see Cashman v. Henry, 75 N.Y. 103 (1878).
While no unqualified assertion has been made that married womens" property acts
were not passed to give the wife an absolute right in her separate property, it seems
strange to attribute that purpose to the legislatures, regardless of how absolute the
phraseology of the statutes may appear. To have given women absolute rights in their
separate property where there was a family unit would seem as inconsistent as granting
a husband absolute rights in his separate property or allowing him to retain his
absolute common law right over family property.
26 Compare Planner v. Planner, 160 N.C. 126, 75 S.E. 9386 (1912) with Tiddy v.
Graves, 126 N.C. 620, 86 S.E. 127 (1900) and Walker v. Long, 109 N.C. 510, 14 S.E.
299 (1891). See 1 MoRDEcu 320, where he notes that "the constitution and former
statutes of North Carolina received such a complicated construction that it was with
very great difficulty that any lawyer could... determine what were the rights of
married women to their own property ...."
2,In re Petersen's Estate, 97 Utah 324, 93 P.2d 445 (1939). The Utah constitution
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If it had chosen to uphold the constitutionality of section 80-1 of
the Intestate Succession Act, the North Carolina Supreme Court
could have reasoned along the following lines. The old curtesy
cases misinterpreted the purpose of the framers of the 1868 provision,
through an overzealous adherence to its literal language. The
Flanner case looked beyond the letter of the law and ascertained
the problem which the provision was intended to correct, and is
the proper interpretation of the purpose of the framers. Moreover,
the curtesy cases can be distinguished, for they construe the effect
which the 1868 provision had on the prior common law, whereas we
choose to follow the Flanner case, which indicates its effect on subsequent statutes. Therefore, the dissent provisions of the act are a
reasonable legislative regulation of the right conferred by the
constitution, and also constitute a legislative expression of policy
on marital rights.28
Dudley v. Staton may have an immediate effect on another provision of the Intestate Succession Act. Section 29-30 provides, as an
alternative to section 30-1, that a dissenting spouse may take absolute
title to the household furnishings and a life estate in one-third of the
real property owned by the decedent during coverture.20 This proprovides that the real and personal property of a married woman "may be conveyed,
devised or bequeathed by her as if she were unmarried." In considering this provision,
and its effect on a statute reserving to the surviving spouse a homestead share in the
property of the decedent, the court said:
I]he very wording of the constitutional provision is such as to evidence an
intent (1) to do away with the common law doctrines under which there was
created by law an estate in the husband as an incident to marriage; and (2)
so freeing it from such interest of the husband, give to the wife the right to
dispose of it. Looking at the provision against its common law background,
there is nothing in its wording which evidences an intention upon the part of its
authors to go further and inhibit the legislature from placing upon the right
to devise the limitation here in question. Its evident aim was to bring about
equality, not inequality, between the parties to a marriage contract." Id. at
329, 93 P.2d at 447.
The court concluded that "the Constitution of this State effects equality between
husband and wife in so far as disposing of her separate property by will is concerned,
and hence the statute reserving to the survivor of either a homestead is not in contravention of the Constitution." Id. at 383, 93 P.2d 449.
28Bolich, supra note 6, at 28. But cf. 1 MORDEcAI at 371, where he states that
"now, married women can devise and bequeath their separate estates just as though
they were femes sole; and an act of the legislature attempting to forbid their devising
their lands so as to deprive their husbands of an estate by the curtesy, is unconstitutional." It appears that he is merely repeating, without comment, the holdings of
Walker v. Long, Tiddy v. Graves, and two subsequent cases discussed supra in notes
19-22.
29 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-30 (Supp. 1961). The life estate shall include the decedent's
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vision is so similar to that struck down by Dudley, that as to the
husband, it probably will also be held to be an unconstitutional
attempt to restrict a married woman's absolute right to devise and
bequeath her separate property. ° Hence, one of the major inequalities produced by an antiquated interpretation of the reconstruction era constitution remains part of North Carolina law, and
requires cure by constitutional amendment.83
usual dwelling house "and lands upon which situated and reasonably necessary to the
use and enjoyment thereof," regardless of any excess value above a one-third interest.
. The status of the lanner case, allowing an afterborn child to take his intestate
share (sustaining what is now § 31-5.5 of the North Carolina General Statutes) is also
doubtful, due to the manner in which Dudley rejects the Flanner interpretation of
the efect of the 1868 provision.
$'See Bolich, supra note 6, at 26-28. See also Polster, The Use of Will Substitutes
to Disinherit the Surviving Spouse, 13 W. REs. L. Ra. 674 (1962), where a variety of

inter vivos devices are suggested by which a husband might cut off the forced share
of his wife.

